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Abstract 
Existing theoretical literature predicts that geographic concentration encourages vertical 
disintegration of firms. Nevertheless, empirical evidence of this prediction is limited, 
especially in developing countries. Using data on manufacturing firms from China, this 
paper documents a positive correlation between geographic concentration and vertical 
disintegration. Additionally, this paper uses the instrumental variable approach to address 
the issue of endogeneity and finds that geographic concentration has a positive causal 
effect on vertical disintegration.  
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Geographic Concentration and Vertical Disintegration: Evidence from China 
 
1. Introduction 
Existing theoretical literature suggests that geographic concentration of industries has important 
effects on the organization of individual firms. Marshall (1920) points out that geographic 
concentration facilitates input sharing among firms,1 and Stigler (1951) argues that input sharing 
can make firms more vertically disintegrated. Recent work further explores the mechanisms 
through which geographic concentration promotes vertical disintegration, such as lowering cost 
(Goldstein and Gronberg, 1984) and reducing opportunism (Helsley and Strange, 2007). 
Empirical evidence regarding the relationship between geographic concentration and 
vertical disintegration has not accumulated significantly. Although a number of case studies 
show a connection between specialized suppliers and vertical disintegration,2 it remains unclear 
whether such a connection can be generalized to other industries.3 Holmes (1999) carries out the 
first rigorous empirical test using data from the 1987 U.S. Census of Manufacturers, and finds a 
positive correlation between geographic concentration and vertical disintegration. 
This paper uses Chinese manufacturing data to further investigate the impacts of geographic 
concentration on vertical disintegration. The economic conditions in China, the largest 
developing economy in the world, are substantially different from those in the U.S. Several 
factors prompt us to investigate the relationship between geographic concentration and vertical 
disintegration in China. First, overall industrial concentration is considerably lower in China than 
in the U.S. According to the EG Index (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997), 80 percent of four-digit 
                                                 
1 Input sharing is one type of Marshallian externality. Marshallian externalities also include knowledge spillover and labor market 
pooling. See Strange (2005) for details. 
2 See, for example, Allen (1929) with regard to the gun industry in nineteenth-century Birmingham, Hall (1959) and Lichtenberg 
(1960) concerning a number of industries that concentrate in New York, and Scott and Kwok (1989) on the printed circuit 
industry in Southern California. More evidence can be found in Scott (1988, 2000). 
3 One important reason is that firm-level data were seldom available in the past (Yang and Ng, 1993; Zhang, 2004). 
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industries in China are classified as not very concentrated, whereas only 10 percent in the U.S. 
can be considered as belonging to the same group (Lu and Tao, 2008). Compared to the U.S. 
economy, the Chinese economy is much less integrated as a whole (Young, 2000; Poncet, 2003), 
a factor that may obstruct the process of geographic concentration.  
Second, in China, the agricultural sector employs about half the national labor force, and 
town and village enterprises account for nearly a third of firms in the manufacturing sector (Au 
and Henderson, 2002). In contrast, more than 75 percent of the U.S. populace lives in cities 
(Rosenthal and Strange, 2006). Such structural differences in the labor force and in the 
manufacturing sector may produce different patterns of industrial concentration and vertical 
disintegration (Picard and Zeng, 2005). 
Third, compared to the U.S., China is an unskilled-labor abundant economy where simple 
processing and assembly activities predominate, thus placing it at the lower end of the world 
value chain. Different production activities may cause differences in the organization of 
production, and we accordingly seek to determine whether manufacturing of low added-value 
products has the same relationship between geographic concentration and vertical disintegration. 
Our study first replicates the analysis in Holmes (1999) using Chinese data, and discovers a 
similar relationship between geographic concentration and vertical disintegration. Within the 
same region and four-digit industry, the ratio of purchased intermediate inputs over output rises 
with own-industry neighboring employment, suggesting that the positive correlation between 
geographic concentration and vertical disintegration initially found by Holmes in the U.S. also 
holds in China. This positive correlation is robust to different specifications, such as including 
nonlinear terms, using more disintegrated (firm/region-level) data,4 and controlling for 
firm/region-level characteristics. Our firm/region-level investigation also provides suggestive 
                                                 
4 Details on the data set will be discussed in Section 3. 
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evidence of Stigler’s (1951) hypothesis; namely, the extent of vertical integration increases for 
young and very old firms, and decreases for mature firms. 
Although Holmes (1999) provides an important contribution, it is still difficult to pinpoint 
the causality between geographic concentration and vertical disintegration due to endogeneity. 
For example, some missing variables causing both vertical disintegration and geographic 
concentration can induce a spurious positive correlation between the two. It is also possible that 
the presence of local suppliers encourages localization and thus reverses the causality.  
As a second contribution, we investigate whether geographic concentration has a causal 
effect on the degree of vertical disintegration using instrumental-variable estimation. Specifically, 
we use the cross-region population of China in 1920 to instrument China’s geographic 
concentration of industries in 2002.5 The validity of our instrumental variable is based on two 
premises: (1) the demand of a larger population attracts more manufacturers in each industry,6 
and (2) the distribution of population persists over time (Davis and Weinstein, 2002). In other 
words, the geographic concentration of industries in 2002 varies with the distribution of 
population as it stood more than 80 years ago, which should have no direct effect on the current 
degree of vertical disintegration of firms. Figure 1 summarizes our instrumental variable 
estimation strategy. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) estimates substantiate our early findings, showing that 
geographic concentration leads firms to be more vertically disintegrated. Moreover, this effect is 
stronger than what is captured by the ordinary-least-squares (OLS) estimates.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the related 
                                                 
5 As for the practice of using historical data as instrumental variables, see, for instance, Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002). 
6 See Krugman (1980) for a theoretical model, and Davis and Weinstein (2003) and Hanson (2005) for empirical supports. 
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literature. Section 3 describes the data and procedures used in constructing the data set. Sections 
4 and 5 report and discuss the OLS and 2SLS results, respectively, including robustness checks. 
Section 6 summarizes our findings and suggests directions for future research.  
 
2. Literature 
A fundamental question in economics concerns the factors that determine the degree of vertical 
integration (or disintegration) of firms. This question can be traced back to Adam Smith (1776, 
Chapter 1), who discusses the division of labor within firm boundaries and the relationship 
between the division of labor and productivity. The idea is extended to specialization among 
firms (Stigler, 1951; Young, 1928), and is tested by Murakami et al. (1996). Stigler (1951) 
proposes another theory on vertical specialization through the lens of industry lifecycle, and his 
main insights are empirically confirmed by Tucker and Wilder (1977) and Levy (1984). 
Two distinct approaches emerge in the study of vertical integration. One is the 
industrial-organization approach, which mainly attributes vertical integration to imperfect 
competition, technological externalities, and asymmetric information.7 The other approach 
examines vertical integration in the context of transaction cost theory (e.g., Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1975, 1985) and property rights theory (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and 
Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). These authors consider specific investment and hold-up issues, which 
interact to determine the degree of vertical integration.8 Recently, interest in the determinants of 
vertical integration has resurfaced.9 In particular, the recent rapid growth of international trade 
                                                 
7 See Perry (1989) for a review of the literature. 
8 There are also empirical studies using this approach. For instance, Baker and Hubbard (2004), Feenstra and Hanson (2005), 
Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007), Joskow (1987), Lieberman (1991), Masten (1984), and Monteverde and Teece (1982). 
9 To this end, there have been theoretical (e.g., Chen, 2005; Chen and Riordan, 2007) as well as empirical (e.g., Acemoglu et al. 
2005, 2007a, 2007b) advancements. 
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has made firms more vertically disintegrated across borders,10 and has inspired a number of 
theoretical papers, for instance, Antràs (2003), Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2006), Antràs et al. 
(2006), Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2004, 2005), McLaren (1999), and Puga and Trefler 
(2002).11
Our paper extends the discussion of vertical disintegration to include a consideration of the 
effects of geographic concentration on individual firms. There are two primary underlying 
reasons for the association between geographic concentration and vertical disintegration. First, 
Goldstein and Gronberg (1984) indicate that geographic concentration encourages vertical 
disintegration by lowering delivered prices for inputs based on proximity to suppliers.12 Second, 
geographic concentration reduces opportunism, and thus substitutes for vertical integration 
(Helsley and Strange, 2007). 
 
3. Data and Statistics 
Our primary data source is the National Statistical Bureau Enterprise Dataset 2002 (NSBED 
2002). The NSBED is a large-scale data set maintained by the National Statistical Bureau of 
China. It contains approximately 100 variables at the firm/region level, including sales revenue, 
location, four-digit industry code, founding year, and employment. The industry section of the 
China Statistical Yearbook 2003 was compiled based on this data set. To maintain comparability 
with Holmes (1999), we focus on the manufacturing industries in the NSBED, and follow his 
procedures in constructing our data set. 
As the most comprehensive micro-level data set in China mainland, the NSBED collects 
                                                 
10 See, for example, Feenstra (1998), Hanson et al. (2005), and Hummels, et al. (1998). 
11 See Spencer (2005), Antràs (2006), and Helpman (2006) for reviews of the literature. 
12 Transport costs have long been identified to comprise the main reason for the geographic concentration of industries since 
Thünen (1826), see Keilbach (2000, Chap.3). Krugman (1991) and Krugman and Venables (1995) address the important role of 
transport costs with distinct models, and it is widely accepted that transport costs penalize vertical integration (Hummels et al., 
2001). As for how geographic concentration affects input sharing, see Duranton and Puga (2001) and Helsley and Strange (2002). 
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data at the firm/region level. A firm may or may not have business operations located in regions 
other than its domicile.13 If a firm has no business operations outside its domicile, the company 
itself constitutes a firm/region-level observation in the data set. If a firm has branches that 
engage in business operations in regions other than its domicile, each branch constitutes a 
firm/region-level observation in the data set. For example, Beijing Huiyuan Beverage and Food 
Group Co., Ltd. has six branches, in Jizhong (Hebei Province), Youyu (Shanxi Province), 
Luzhong (Shandong Province), Qiqihar (Heilongjiang Province), Chengdu (Sichuan Province), 
and Yanbian (Jilin Province); the NSBED accordingly counts them as six different 
firm/region-level observations belonging to six different regions, in addition to their parent 
company located in Beijing.  
It is noteworthy that the U.S. census data used by Holmes (1999) are collected at the plant 
level, which is more disaggregated than the firm/region level. Data collected at the firm/region 
level have certain advantages over those collected at the plant level for our purposes. First, as 
Eckard (1979) points out, the U.S. census assigns an industry code to a plant according to the 
primary output of this plant; consequently, an integrated plant remains in its initial industry, and 
thus a cross-industry transaction between it and its parent is counted as outsourcing. In the 
NSBED, such a transaction will not be counted as outsourcing. In addition, outsourcing decisions, 
which affect the competitive strategies of firms, are more likely to be made at the firm/region 
level (the regional headquarter) rather than at the plant level. 
In our exercise, the set of firm/region-level observations that belong to four-digit industry  
and region  is denoted by , =1,...,518, and =1,...,31.
i
a ( , )i aE i a
14 The costs of intermediate 
                                                 
13 Regions refer to 31 province-level regions in China, including 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, and 4 municipalities.  
14 Due to limitations in the official data-collecting practice, the economic literature that investigates the agglomeration in China 
typically uses province-level or more aggregated data. See, for instance, Wen (2004) and Bai et al. (2004). Additionally, we use 
province-level region data because the province-level in China is similar to the state-level in the U.S. Input sharing is the most 
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inputs divided by sales revenue is defined as the purchased-inputs intensity (PII) for a 
firm/region-level observation , and is used to measure the degree of vertical 
disintegration.
),(∈ aiEx
15 These firm/region-level statistics are then aggregated to the industry/region 
level by 
 
( , )
( , )
i a
i a x xx E
PII w PII∈=∑ , 
where  is the purchased-inputs intensity of , and  is the share of a given ),( aiPII ),( ai xw x  in 
the total output of  ),( ai
 
( , )i a
x
x
xx E
outputw
output∈
= ∑ . 
Since plant-level output is unavailable in Holmes’ (1999) data set, he uses employment share 
instead. Fortunately, firm/region-level employment and output are both available in the NSBED 
2002, so we use both weights in this paper. 
We implement this study primarily at the industry/region level, and use firm/region-level 
findings only as robustness checks. There are several reasons for this strategy. First, we intend 
for our findings to be comparable to those of Holmes (1999), which aggregates available 
plant-level data to the industry/region level. Second, an inherent defect of PII is that it can be 
easily contaminated by micro-level productivity heterogeneity. Higher productivity can increase 
added value, thereby decreasing the ratio of purchased intermediate inputs over output, which is 
likely to be misinterpreted as less vertical disintegration. Productivity heterogeneity arguably 
cancels out at more aggregated levels—such as the industry/region level—and consequently 
                                                                                                                                                             
likely determinant in our context; Rosenthal and Strange (2001) find that reliance on inputs positively affects agglomeration at 
the state level, but this effect hardly exists at lower levels of the geographic unit.  
15 There are a number of methods to measure vertical integration (or disintegration). For example, Chapman and Ashton (1914) 
use the number of equipment items; Gort (1962) uses employment in each industry; Guidelines for Vertical Restraints (1985) of 
the U.S. Department of Justice use the Herfindahl-Hirsclman index; Acemoglu et al. (2007b) use vertical integration coefficients. 
PII originates from Adelman (1955), and is widely used in the literature, e.g., Laffer (1969), Tucker and Wilder (1977), Levy 
(1984), and Holmes (1999). For a detailed discussion of vertical-integration measurement, see Perry (1989). 
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eliminates productivity heterogeneity from the measured degree of vertical disintegration. Third, 
as discussed in the next section, our instrumental-variable data are available only at the region 
level. 
The employment of neighboring firms is used to measure geographic concentration. We 
define three types of neighboring firms. Own-industry neighboring firms for a given x  is the 
observations other than x  located in the same four-digit industry/region; their total employment 
is denoted by . Own-industry neighboring employment in each  is defined to be ownxEMP ),( ai
 
( , )
( , )
i a
own own
i a x xx E
EMP w EMP∈=∑ . 
Related-industry neighboring firms for a given x  are defined as those belonging to the 
same two-digit industry as x  but different four-digit industries. Their total employment is 
denoted by . Related-industry neighboring employment is defined to be relatedxEMP
 
( , )
( , )
i a
related related
i a x xx E
EMP w EMP∈=∑ . 
Finally, we introduce other-industry neighboring firms for a given x , each of which is 
neither x ’s own-industry neighboring observations nor x ’s related-industry neighboring 
observations, while they are in the same region as x . Other-industry neighboring employment 
),a  is defined in i as (
       
( , )
( , )
i a
other other
i a x xx E
EMP w EMP∈=∑ . 
Table 1 summarizes the industry/region-level data set we use in this paper. Panels A and B 
report the descriptive statistics of variables weighted by employment and output, respectively. 
The statistics for related- and other-industry neighboring employment are identical in these two 
panels, because the firms within the same industry/region have the same set of related- and 
other-industry neighboring firms. The weighted sums of employment in these observations are 
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thus equal, whichever weights are adopted. Panel C presents descriptive statistics of the 
instrumental variable, as well as other related information. The data on region-level population 
for China in 1920, our instrumental variable, were collected by the China Continuation 
Committee, a western missionary organization.16 In the absence of a national statistical 
institution in China in the 1920s, this constitutes one of the most reliable data sources. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
4. The OLS results 
The first model in Holmes (1999) is specified as 
* *
( , ) ( , ) ( , )= +
own
i a i a i aPII αEMP ε
*
                                                
, 
where the asterisk means that the variable is demeaned by its industry average. By demeaning 
the variables, this specification controls for industry fixed effects. Weighted-least-squares (WLS) 
technique is then used to estimate the model, and the weights are given according to the number 
of firm/region-level observations in each , with a correction to account for the asymmetry 
of size among these observations.
),( ai
17,18 In Model 2 and Model 3,  and  are 
incorporated sequentially. Model 4 introduces squared and cubic terms for each explanatory 
variable. His results are reproduced in Table 2a. 
related
xEMP
other
xEMP
[Table 2a about here] 
We estimate Models 1–4 using Chinese data following the same procedure, and the results 
are reported in Table 2b. Model 1 demonstrates a positive correlation between PII and 
own-industry neighboring employment. The estimated coefficient is 0.017 (s.e.=0.001), which 
 
16 Specifically, the data were collected by the Special Committee on Survey and Occupation of China Continuation Committee. 
Note that the divisions of regions used by the China Continuation Committee differ from those under the current Chinese regime, 
so that the population of each region has been recalculated according to the current regional divisions. 
17 See the appendix of Holmes (1999) for details on constructing this weight.   
18 We re-estimate these models without weights and obtain nearly identical results. Results are available upon request.  
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means that the conditional expectation of PII increases by 0.017 percentage points if 
own-industry neighboring employment increases by 1,000. In terms of standard deviation, if 
own-industry neighboring employment increases by one standard deviation, PII would rise by 
0.228 (0.017 times 13.4) percentage points. This is comparable to Holmes’ (1999) finding with 
the U.S. census data: PII rises by 0.188 (0.04 times 4.7)19 percentage points if own-industry 
neighboring employment increases by one standard deviation. 
[Table 2b about here] 
The rationale behind this positive correlation is straightforward. Consider two motor-vehicle 
manufacturers, one locating where peers are geographically concentrated, and the other not. 
Ceteris paribus, the first motor-home manufacturer, would have a higher PII because it can 
locally outsource parts at lower costs (not limited to lower transport costs), whereas the other 
lacks this advantage. Another interpretation of this finding is that industrial concentration 
depresses opportunism, and therefore motor-vehicle manufacturers do not take advantage of 
local peers by incomplete contracts where peers are concentrated (Helsley and Strange, 2007). In 
addition, proximity of potential outside options weakens the hold-up problem.  
Model 2 and Model 3 lead to the same finding. Notably, the coefficient of own-industry 
neighboring employment, although it drops in magnitude, is still significantly positive. The drop 
is possibly because the coefficient of own-industry neighboring employment in Model 1 picks up 
population scale effect as well;20 namely, large population, in addition to geographic 
concentration of industries, also raises PII. This is not surprising because, as shown by Rosenthal 
and Strange (2005), density of employment has a positive effect on the births of new firms, 
                                                 
19 The standard deviation of own-industry neighboring employment is 4.7 in Holmes (1999). 
20 The population scale effect in this paper is conventionally called “urbanization effect” in the literature. We use the term 
“population scale effect” instead of “urbanization effect” because a large proportion of manufacturers in China are town and 
village enterprises (Au and Henderson, 2002), which are located in rural areas.    
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which are potential input suppliers of existing firms. Related- and other-industry neighboring 
employments are included to control for the population scale effect; evidently, this does not 
eliminate the correlation between own-industry neighboring employment and PII, clearly 
attesting to the presence of a geographic-concentration effect. Model 4 demonstrates the same 
concave relationship as Holmes (1999): positive coefficient of neighboring employments, 
negative for squared terms, and positive for cubic terms.  
The advantages of our data allow us to implement two robustness checks. First, since 
Holmes (1999) does not have access to plant-level outputs, he uses plant-level employment to 
weight neighboring employment instead. Fortunately, firm/region-level outputs are available in 
the NSBED. We repeat the same procedure using output as our weight. The results are reported 
as Models 5–8 of Table 2b, in which we find no essential differences from Models 1–4. 
Second, Holmes (1999) aggregates establishment-level variables to the industry/region level 
because he has no access to plant-level purchased inputs or outputs. The NSBED reports 
firm/region-level purchased inputs and outputs, an advantage that allows us to implement a 
micro-level investigation. Table 2c presents the results obtained with firm/region-level data, 
leading to the same findings as the industry/region-level study. Comparing Table 2b with Table 
2c, we observe only marginal differences in both magnitudes and significance levels of 
coefficients. 
[Table 2c about here] 
Firm/region-level age and assets have been controlled for in Table 2c.21 Following Tucker 
and Wilder (1977), we include the level, squared, and cubic terms of age, and find the same 
pattern of their signs (Age -, Age2 +, Age3 -). This pattern is conventionally interpreted as 
                                                 
21 The size of firm/region measured by employment is not included, because it is, by construction, strongly linearly correlated 
with neighboring employment. 
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evidence of Stigler’s hypothesis: the extent of vertical integration increases for young and very 
old firms, and decreases for mature firms (Stigler 1951; Tucker and Wilder, 1977; Levy, 1984). 
As expected, the coefficient of assets is negative, since capital-intensive industries, such as steel 
and chemistry industries, involve a higher degree of vertical integration for technical reasons 
(Perry, 1989). 
 
5. The 2SLS results 
To address the concern that OLS estimates could be biased due to potential endogeneity, we 
employ instrumental-variable estimation. We use the cross-region population of China in 1920 to 
instrument China’s geographic concentration of industries in 2002. The theory of our 
instrumental variable rests on two premises: (1) demand generated by a larger population attracts 
more manufacturers in each industry, and (2) the distribution of population persists over time. 
According to the model presented by Krugman (1980), the demand of a community rises with 
the number of manufacturers located there, all of whom aim to minimize their transport costs. 
Moreover, the larger the number of varieties, the lower the living costs, which attracts migration. 
Thus, the number of manufacturers and the size of population are positively correlated in 
equilibrium, which is called home market bias. This has been supported by a number of 
empirical works (e.g., Davis and Weinstein, 2003; Hanson, 2005).  
[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2 plots geographic concentration in the manufacturing sectors against the population 
of 31 regions, showing a strong positive relationship between them. Regions where populations 
are larger have stronger demand, and thus the size of the manufacturing sector is larger, 
supporting our first premise at an aggregated level.  
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The support for premise (2) is derived from the location fundamentals theory, which predicts 
that fundamental characteristics of locations change little over time. This premise is empirically 
tested by Davis and Weinstein (2002) using Japanese data. Chinese data also support this 
argument; as is evident from Figure 3, the population size in each region persists over time. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
We use the natural logarithm of the population in 1920 to instrument . This identification 
strategy is valid as long as the population in 1920 has no effect on the current degree of vertical 
disintegration through channels other than current geographic concentration.  
own
aiEMP ),(
The 2SLS estimates are presented in Table 3.22 Models 1 and 2 report the results with 
variables weighted by employment and output, respectively. In the first stage of Table 3, the 
logarithm of population in 1920 is shown to have a strong effect on current geographic 
concentration. In the second stage, the coefficients of own-industry neighboring employment are 
0.079 (when employment weight is used) and 0.098 (when output weight is used), approximately 
five times larger than that estimated by OLS, thereby indicating that endogeneity causes the OLS 
coefficient to be biased downward.23
[Table 3 about here] 
We next implement several robustness checks. One possible concern is that the correlation 
between historical population and industrial concentration may vary across industries. For 
example, if transport costs are relatively small, the correlation between historical population and 
industrial concentration is expected to be low, which undermines the validity of our instrument. 
                                                 
22 The data on the population of Ningxia and Qinghai in 1920 are unavailable, so the samples from these two provinces are not 
included in our 2SLS analysis. 
23 There are several potential sources of endogeneity. First, as discussed in the introduction, manufacturers may localize where 
there are plenty of outsourcing opportunities; under certain conditions, this reverse causality makes OLS estimates biased 
downward. Omitted variables are also a likely source of endogeneity. For instance, technological spillovers may cause 
manufacturers to concentrate, but manufacturers choose to integrate their suppliers to keep their technological recipes—such as 
blueprint, specification, and requirements—confidential, causing downward bias in the estimated effect of geographic 
concentration on vertical disintegration. 
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To address this concern, we perform regressions of geographic concentration on historical 
population with data from each of the 518 four-digit industries, and then plot a histogram of the 
518 estimated coefficients. Figure 4 shows that the coefficients cluster between 0 and 1. We then 
focus on a sub-sample of those four-digit industries with estimated coefficients smaller than 0.1. 
The results reported in Table 4 show that geographic concentration still has a large and 
statistically significant effect on the degree of vertical disintegration.24
[Figure 4 and Table 4 about here] 
Another possible concern is that the correlation between own-industry neighboring 
employment and population in 1920 may actually capture population scale effect. Specifically, a 
region with a larger population may have larger own-industry neighboring employment as well 
as larger related- and other-industry neighboring employments, and thus the coefficient picks up 
the effect of larger population rather than that of geographic concentration. To address this 
concern, we control for related- and other-industry neighboring employments in the 2SLS 
regressions. Table 5 presents the results. The estimated coefficients of own-industry neighboring 
employment are nearly the same as those in Table 3, in terms of both magnitude and significance 
level. Meanwhile, the estimated coefficients of related-industry neighboring employment are also 
nearly the same as those from the OLS estimation (see Model 3 and Model 7 in Table 2b).  
Supposing that population scale effect is driving the results, we would observe that the 
explanatory power of own-industry neighboring employment no longer exists once both related- 
and other-industry neighboring employment are included in the regression. This is untrue in our 
study, as shown by Table 5. Furthermore, the coefficient of other-industry neighboring 
                                                 
24 An interesting observation is that the estimated coefficients of own-industry neighboring employment are much higher 
compared with those in Table 3, e.g., 0.722 vs.0.079. One likely interpretation is that in this sub-sample where the correlation 
between population and concentration is low, factors other than transport costs may contribute more to industrial concentration, 
and further boost the degree of vertical disintegration. Agglomeration economies whose sources are knowledge spillovers, labor 
market pooling, or input sharing all manifest themselves in very similar ways (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). A detailed 
discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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employment is not significantly different from zero, also suggesting that population scale effect 
is not a significant concern.  
[Table 5 about here] 
We also experiment with an alternative instrument variable: the geographic concentration of 
industries across regions of China in 2002 is instrumented by that prior to 1978. In 1978, China 
began its transition from a planned economy to a market economy. The economic environment 
prior to 1978 was very different from that in 2002. Prior to 1978, most firms in China were 
owned by the government, and the country was under a central-planning economic regime, 
which allowed little room for firms to make independent business decisions. After nearly three 
decades of reform, Chinese firms now have full control over their activities. Thus, geographic 
concentration across industry/region prior to 1978 is expected to have no direct effects on the 
outsourcing decisions of firms in 2002. 
As employment and output data from the pre-1978 era are unavailable, we use the numbers 
of firm/region-level observations established before 1978 in each industry/region as a measure of 
geographic concentration. Number of manufacturing units is widely used in the literature to 
measure the degree of geographic concentration. For example, Dinlersoz (2004) finds that U.S. 
cities with larger populations tend to have higher manufacturing employment through a larger 
number of establishments. We find in our sample that the number of firm/region-level 
observations is strongly correlated with neighboring employment at the industry/region level.25  
The results are reported in Table 6.26   
[Table 6 about here] 
Related- and other-industry neighboring employment data are also instrumented to address 
                                                 
25 The correlation coefficient is 0.88. 
26 We omit the first-stage results to save space. They are available upon request.  
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the concern that a larger number of firm/region-level observations may be caused by population 
scale effect. Consistent with our previous results, geographic concentration has a positive and 
statistically significant effect on the degree of vertical disintegration. The magnitudes of the 
coefficients (0.011 and 0.010) approximately double their OLS counterparts (0.005 and 0.006, in 
Model 3 and Model 7 of Table 2b, respectively).27
Furthermore, we conduct 2SLS regressions with firm/region-level data as a robustness check, 
and the results are reported in Table 7.28,29 The 2SLS coefficient is 0.111, much higher than the 
OLS coefficient 0.011 (see Table 2c), suggesting the same downward bias in the OLS estimate as 
in the industry/region-level study. The signs of age variables still support Stigler’s (1951) 
hypothesis mentioned earlier. These findings are also robust to the inclusion of related- and 
other-industry neighboring employment. 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
6. Conclusion and Future Research 
Using data from the U.S. Census of Manufacturers, Holmes (1999) finds a positive correlation 
between geographic concentration and degree of vertical disintegration. China, the largest 
developing economy in the world, has economic conditions very different from the U.S. We use 
Chinese manufacturing data to replicate the work of Holmes (1999), and find the same 
correlation between geographic concentration and vertical disintegration in China. 
To investigate whether geographic concentration has a causal effect on vertical disintegration, 
we next use population data from more than 80 years ago to instrument geographic concentration 
                                                 
27 Note that the 2SLS estimates using different instruments are asymptotically equivalent, but not necessarily equal. 
28 In Table 7, we use dummy variables to control for two-digit- rather than four-digit-industry fixed effects, because regressions 
with 150,777 observations and 517 four-digit-industry dummy variables demand equipment that can do very intensive computing, 
to which we do not have access.  
29 As the instrument (i.e., the cross-region population of China in 1920) is available only at the region level, these results should 
be interpreted with caution. 
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in China. Our estimates show that (1) geographic concentration has a positive and statistically 
significant causal effect on the degree of vertical disintegration, and (2) the coefficient of 
geographic concentration turns out to be much higher when endogeneity is treated. In other 
words, geographic concentration actually has a stronger influence than previously expected.  
Future research can expand upon the ideas presented in this paper in several ways. First, the 
measure of vertical disintegration used in this study, as mentioned in Holmes (1999), “has 
well-known inadequacies.” When data conditions permit, a study with other measures of vertical 
disintegration should be undertaken. Second, future research should also examine whether the 
effect of geographic concentration on vertical disintegration varies over time. Recent 
technological developments are believed to be transforming the internal organization of firms 
(Acemoglu et al., 2005).  Thus, the role of geographic concentration is likely to change because 
the importance of geographic concentration on vertical disintegration may wane in an idealized 
“global village.”  
Third, it will be interesting to investigate the relationship between the causality identified in 
this paper and firm size, industrial structure, and corporate organization. Rosenthal and Strange 
(2003, 2008) find that employment at small firms, compared to that at large firms, presents much 
greater attraction to potential new arrivals, and creates a virtuous circle that favors the 
entrepreneurial creation of more small establishments. Small firms can be either the outcome of 
vertical disintegration, or the cause for vertical disintegration. Future research in this direction 
may shed light on how external increasing return generates geographic concentration, which is a 
fundamental question in urban economic discourse. 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Description  Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Employment-Weighted Variables 
PII х 100  80.7 10.46 5.8 100 
Neighboring Employment (1,000 employees) 
Own-Industry  3.4 13.29 0 536.0 
Related-Industry  76.7 106.79 0 820.9 
Other-Industry  1651.7 1503.58 11.2 5776.6 
 
Panel B:  Summary Statistics of Output-Weighted Variables 
PII х 100  81.1 10.82 5.8 100 
Neighboring Employment (1,000 employees) 
Own-Industry  3.4 13.35 0 536.3 
Related-Industry  76.7 106.79 0 820.9 
Other-Industry  1651.7 1503.58 11.2 5776.6 
 
Panel C: Other 
Population in 1920 (1,000 persons)  18486.1 13605.67 1054.8 60129.4 
No. of firms in (i,a)  15.0 42.876 1 1682 
No. of 4-digit China SIC industries  518    
No. of 2-digit China SIC industries  29    
No. of regions (provinces)  31    
  
TABLE 2A: OLS RESULTS IN HOLMES (1999)     
Data: U.S. Census 1987 
Level: Industry/Region 
 
Model 
Own-Industry  Related-Industry  Other-Industry  
R2 
Level 
(1,000) 
Level 
squared 
Level 
cubic 
Level 
(1,000) 
Level 
squared 
Level 
cubic 
Level 
(1,000) 
Level 
squared 
Level 
cubic 
1 
0.04 
(0.01) 
        0.001 
2 
0.04 
(0.02) 
  
0.000 
(0.003) 
     0.001 
3 
0.05 
(0.02) 
  
0.009 
(0.004) 
  
-0.0013 
(0.0004) 
  0.002 
4 
0.35 
(0.07) 
-0.013 
(0.003) 
0.00012 
(0.00004) 
-0.054 
(0.023) 
0.0009 
(0.0003) 
-3.0e-6 
(1.2e-6) 
0.0025 
(0.0032) 
-1.4e-5 
(0.7e-5) 
1.0e-8 
(0.4e-8) 
0.006 
Note: This table is a duplicate of the first panel of Table 3 in Holmes (1999). Asterisks are not reported in the original table. 
TABLE 2B: OLS RESULTS     
Data: China NSBED 2002 
Level: Industry/Region 
 
Model 
Own-Industry Related-Industry Other-Industry 
Weighted  
by 
R2 
Level 
(1,000) 
Level 
squared 
Level 
cubic 
Level 
(1,000) 
Level 
squared 
Level 
cubic 
Level 
(1,000) 
Level 
squared 
Level 
cubic 
1 
0.017*** 
(0.001) 
        Employment 0.029 
2 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
  
0.008*** 
(0.0004) 
     Employment 0.071 
3 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
  
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
  
0.0008*** 
(0.00004) 
  Employment 0.105 
4 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
-0.00009*** 
(0.00003) 
1.15e-07*** 
(4.00e-08) 
0.019*** 
(0.003) 
-0.00005*** 
(9.49e-06) 
4.22e-08*** 
(8.59e-09) 
0.001** 
(0.0004) 
-1.67e-07 
(1.32e-07) 
1.59e-11 
(1.47e-11) 
Employment 0.111 
5 
0.019*** 
(0.001) 
        Output 0.029 
6 
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
  
0.010*** 
(0.0004) 
     Output 0.072 
7 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
  
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
  
0.0008*** 
(0.00004) 
  Output 0.106 
8 
0.029*** 
(0.006) 
-150.1*** 
(34.9) 
2.00e-07*** 
(4.96e-08) 
0.021*** 
(0.003) 
-0.00006*** 
(0.00001) 
4.39e-08*** 
(9.51e-09) 
0.001** 
(0.0004) 
-2.03e-07 
(1.43e-07) 
2.36e-11 
(1.60e-11) 
Output 0.113 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients are rounded to their nearest neighbors. 
  
TABLE 2C: OLS RESULTS     
Data: China NSBED 2002  
Level: Firm/Region  
 
Model 
Own-Industry Related-Industry Other-Industry 
Age Age2 Age3 
Logarithm 
of assets 
R2 Level 
(1,000) 
Level 
squared 
Level 
Cubic 
Level 
(1,000) 
Level 
squared 
Level 
Cubic 
Level 
(1,000) 
Level 
squared 
Level 
Cubic 
1 
0.013*** 
(0.000) 
        
-0.051*** 
(0.007) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-9.11e-07*** 
(3.48e-07) 
-0.587*** 
(0.020) 
0.12 
2 
0.011*** 
(0.000) 
  
0.008*** 
(0.000) 
     
-0.042*** 
(0.007) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-8.92e-07** 
(3.56e-07) 
-0.592*** 
(0.020) 
0.13 
3 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
  
0.002*** 
(0.000) 
  
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
  
-0.033*** 
(0.007) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-9.66e-07*** 
(3.72e-07) 
-0.609*** 
(0.020) 
0.14 
4 
0.035*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
1.51e-07*** 
(1.38e-08) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.00001*** 
(4.90e-06) 
1.33e-08*** 
(4.34e-09) 
0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
1.38e-07 
(8.66e-08) 
-2.72e-11*** 
(9.07e-12) 
-0.031*** 
(0.007) 
0.0003** 
(0.0001) 
-9.76e-07*** 
(3.75e-07) 
-0.622*** 
(0.020) 
0.14 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients are rounded to their nearest neighbors. 
 
 
TABLE 3: 2SLS RESULTS 
Level: Industry/Region 
 
Model 
1 2 
Employment weighted Output weighted 
Panel A: Second stage (dependent variable: PII) 
Own-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.079*** 
(0.004) 
0.098*** 
(0.005) 
Panel B: First stage (dependent variable: own-industry neighboring employment in 2002) 
Logarithm of population in 1920 
1.754*** 
(0.057) 
1.555*** 
(0.055) 
Shea Partial R2 0.088 0.075 
p-value for F test 0.000 0.000 
No. of Obs. 9939 9939 
Panel C: OLS estimates 
Own-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.019*** 
(0.001) 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients are 
rounded to their nearest neighbors. 
 
TABLE 4: ROBUSTNESS CHECK I: SUB-SAMPLE 
Level: Industry/Region 
 
Model  
1 2 
Employment weighted Output weighted 
Panel A: Second stage (dependent variable: PII) 
Own-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.722*** 
(0.092) 
0.796*** 
(0.101) 
Panel B: First stage (dependent variable: own-industry neighboring employment in 2002) 
Logarithm of population in 1920 
0.143*** 
(0.006) 
0.139*** 
(0.006) 
Shea Partial R2 0.160 0.145 
p-value for F test 0.000 0.000 
No. of Obs. 2987 2987 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients are 
rounded to their nearest neighbors. 
 
TABLE 5: ROBUSTNESS CHECK II: POPULATION SCALE EFFECT 
Level: Industry/Region 
 
Model  
1 2 
Employment weighted Output weighted 
Panel A: Second stage (dependent variable: PII) 
Own-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.077*** 
(0.014) 
0.109*** 
(0.017) 
Related-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.002*** 
(0.0006) 
0.003*** 
(0.0008) 
Other-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
-0.0003 
(0.0002) 
Panel B: First stage (dependent variable: own-industry neighboring employment in 2002) 
Logarithm of population in 1920 
0.606*** 
(0.065) 
0.550*** 
(0.062) 
Related-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
Other-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.010*** 
(0.0004) 
0.010*** 
(0.0004) 
Shea Partial R2 0.088 0.079 
p-value for F test 0.000 0.000 
No. of Obs. 9939 9939 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients are 
rounded to their nearest neighbors. 
 
TABLE 6: ROBUSTNESS CHECK III: ALTERNATIVE IV  
Level: Industry/Region 
 
 
Model  
1 2 
Employment weighted Output weighted 
Panel A: 2SLS estimates, the second stage (dependent variable: PII) 
Own-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.010*** 
(0.003) 
Related-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
Other-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.0008*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0009*** 
(0.0001) 
No. of Obs. 10129 10129 
Panel B: OLS estimates (dependent variable: PII) 
Own-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Related-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Other-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.0008*** 
(0.00004) 
0.0008*** 
(0.00004) 
No. of Obs. 10129 10129 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients are 
rounded to their nearest neighbors. The first-stage results are not reported due to space limit, but available upon 
request. 
 
 
TABLE 7: ROBUSTNESS CHECK IV: BRANCH-LEVEL STUDY 
Level: Firm/Region 
 
Model 1 2 
Panel A: Second stage (dependent variable: PII) 
Own-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
0.111*** 
(0.003) 
0.179*** 
(0.016) 
Related-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
 0.008*** 
(0.0007) 
Other-industry neighboring employment in 2002 
 -0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
Age  
-0.034*** 
(0.007) 
-0.037*** 
(0.008) 
Age2 
0.0005*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
Age3 
-1.47e-06*** 
(4.34e-07) 
-1.68e-06*** 
(4.82e-07) 
Logarithm of assets 
-0.752*** 
(0.022) 
-0.823*** 
(0.031) 
Panel B: First stage (dependent variable: own-industry neighboring employment in 2002) 
Logarithm of population in 1920 
12.8*** 
(0.14) 
3.25*** 
(0.15) 
Related-Industry neighboring employment in 2002 
 -0.037*** 
(0.002) 
Other-Industry neighboring employment in 2002 
 0.011*** 
(0.0001) 
Age  
-0.120*** 
(.026) 
0.015 
(0.025) 
Age2 -0.0013** -0.0016*** 
(0.0006) (0.0005) 
Age3 
4.90e-06*** 
(1.85e-06) 
3.97e-06*** 
(1.37e-06) 
Logarithm of assets 
1.449*** 
(0.083) 
1.209*** 
(0.082) 
Shea Partial R2 0.040 0.002 
p-value for F test 0.00 0.00 
No. of Obs.† 150777 150777 
Panel C: OLS estimates 
Own-Industry in 2002 
0.013*** 
(0.000) 
0.005*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients are rounded to their nearest neighbors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: IDENTIFICATION STRATEGY 
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FIGURE 2: GEOGRAPHIC CONCENTRATION AND POPULATION 
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FIGURE 3: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT POPULATIONS 
 
 
FIGURE 4: ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS ACROSS 518 FOUR-DIGIT INDUSTRIES 
 
